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ABSTRACT 
The EU lacks the legal ideology as a social instrument that could satisfy the spirit of 
liberal democracy and would help to consolidate different societies to a solid European 
demos. Although the existence of an ideological system alone does not guarantee social 
consensus, it helps to manage dissension within the limits of particular values and norms. It 
is because a legal ideology provides the structure for social thought that individuals and 
social groups are able to interpret the nature of emerging conflicts and the interests they 
support.  
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The article demonstrates that the neoliberal way of thinking that prevails in 
contemporary Europe does not meet the spirit of the constitutionalism of the EU Member 
States; the article introduces some aspects of Aharon Barak’s legal ideology that could be 
relevant for the formation and development of European demos and constitutionalism. In 
order to achieve this aim, the research is focused on issues that emerge in the area of three 
main pillars of constitutionalism: (1) adherence to the rule of law, (2) limited and 
accountable government, and (3) protection of fundamental human rights. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Constitutionalism, the European Union, Aharon Barak, rule of law, human rights, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional systems of the European Union (hereinafter – the EU) 
Member States and their legal practice as well as their culture of legal 
interpretation – their constitutionalism – concern the same object: rules concerning 
independent self-governing political community and fundamental human rights. As 
G. Nolte notes: 
‘European constitutionalism’ seems to embody something, which is both more 
removed from ‘the people’ and more vague than national constitutional law. (…) 
The development of European integration, however, has started to make these 
clear-cut differences disappear. This is not only because a European entity is 
developing which more closely resembles a state. It is also because the 
European states themselves and their characteristic constitutionalisms are being 
transformed by the process of European integration. This is visible most clearly 
in the jurisprudence of the European Courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg.1 
However, today the EU is in the deepest crisis since its establishment. This fact 
raises new challenges for European constitutionalism. This crisis has many factors 
and faces but the main problem is the absence of clear strategic guidelines for the 
further development of the EU. This situation is mainly caused by the intensification 
of globalisation processes and growing internal and external threats. External 
threats such as poverty of the Third World countries, increasing international 
terrorism and militaristic attempts of particular states that violate international law 
fosters global flows of migrants, refugees and asylum applicants.  In terms of 
security, the prevention of complex external threats requires not only additional 
investment, but also has a significant negative impact on the condition of the EU 
Member States’ social values, which are still fragile after the financial and economic 
crisis. 
At the very beginning of the twenty-first century I. Pernice stressed that the 
contemporary state: 
is unable on its own to fulfil certain tasks of common interest, such as the 
preservation of liberty, peace, security and welfare of their citizens. 
International crime and terrorism, global trade and financial markets, climate 
change and unlimited communication worldwide etc. need new structures of 
governance. The various aspects of globalisation show that classical concepts 
                                         
1 Georg Nolte, “European and US constitutionalism: comparing essential elements”: 5; in: Georg Nolte, 
ed., European and US Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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such as national sovereignty and the belief in unlimited powers of the state are 
outdated and nothing more than cosy – if not dangerous – illusions.2 
We agree with the author; however, we also observe that these new structures of 
governance are insufficient without an adequate legal ideology that could serve as a 
basis for European demos3 building since the lack of European demos becomes one 
of the most essential restrictions for the formation of European constitutionalism 
under conditions of negative challenges of globalisation and growing importance of 
public security4.  
Thus, the EU lacks the legal ideology wielded as a social instrument that could 
satisfy the spirit of liberal democracy and would help to consolidate different 
societies to a solid European demos. Although the existence of the ideological 
system alone does not guarantee social consensus, it helps to manage dissension 
within the limits of particular values and norms. Because the ideology provides a 
structure for social thought, individuals and social groups are able to interpret the 
nature of emerging conflicts and the interests they support. Accordingly, the 
ideology provides a context in which the social symbols and institutions are 
interpreted in which their sense and meaning is anchored. 
The process of the integration of the EU Member States under conditions of 
globalisation, free market, and intensification of international terrorism results in 
the emergence of new factors that destabilize classical socio-cultural tensions 
between government and society, order and justice, and freedom and security, that 
had been in a relative balance during the time of peace in which the EU was born 
and developed. 5  These circumstances require taking into account the relevant 
constitutional-legal experience of countries that successfully function under 
conditions of terrorism and free-market. Israel has a very rich practice in coping 
with threats of terror acts. Therefore, the international security experts stress the 
need to explore the Israeli security model.6  
                                         
2 Ingolf Pernice, “Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union” (July 2001) // 
http://www.whi-berlin.eu/documents/whi-paper0502.pdf. 
3  Demos - “a group of people, the majority of whom feel sufficiently connected to each other to 
voluntarily commit to a democratic discourse and to a related decision-making process” (Lars-Erik 
Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What It Would Take to Construct a European 
Demos,” European Journal of International Relations 7(2) (2001): 224; as cited in: Daniel Innerarity, 
“Does Europe Need a Demos to Be Truly Democratic?” The London School of Economic and Political 
Science (July 2014) // 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS%20Discussion%20Paper%20Series/LEQSPaper77.pdf). 
4 See more e.g.: Daniel Innerarity, supra note 3. 
5  See: Jolanta Bieliauskaitė, Vytautas Šlapkauskas, Milda Vainiutė, and Darijus Beinoravičius, 
“Constitutionalizm as the Instrument of Security and Sustainability in European Union Law,” Journal of 
Security and Sustainability Issues Vol. 5, No. 3 (March 2016): 380-387 // 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2016.5.3(6) 
6 See: Jeffrey A. Larsen and Tasha L. Pravecek, “Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security Study,” 
Counterproliferation Paper No. 34 (2006) // 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/larsen3.pdf. 
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There is no doubt that the status of Israel and the EU is different. Israel is a 
state, the EU is a union of the states. Although both Israel and the EU (former 
European Communities) were established in the middle of the twentieth century, 
the Jewish nation that lives in the state of Israel and outside it has strong identity 
based on common historical experience and a rich culture. However, there is an 
important similarity between Israel and the EU. Israel as well as the EU has no 
single complete constitutional document, it has developed an operative constitution 
of its own, embodied in a set of written texts that reflect the political system on 
which the state is based, its social content, and an expanding constitutional 
tradition. Those texts7 were properly promulgated by the representatives of the 
people and recognized as constitutional by Israel’s Supreme Court8. The EU also 
does not have a constitution and still there are scholars who maintain that the 
constitution of the EU consists of several legal documents9. These circumstances 
reveal the necessity to talk about constitutionalism not only as a system of 
constitutional texts and their interpretations, or constitutional order, but also as a 
constitutional culture and metaconstitutional inquiry. This broadly understood 
concept of constitutionalism includes not only legal, but also political and 
philosophical components. Its core is constituted by the principles and values, 
which maintain the idea of the restriction of government by law and human 
rights.10 
Aharon Barak is a prominent legal scholar and justice, whose precedent-
setting rulings while serving on the Israeli Supreme Court, established the court as 
a powerful and independent institution. His innovative legal concepts and activities, 
which are the excellent example of coherence between personal and professional 
experience, legal thought and legal practice, have influenced judicial thought world-
wide. The name of A. Barak is often associated with the Constitutional Revolution in 
Israel11 and the maintenance of constitutional democracy. 
The article shows that the neoliberal way of thinking does not meet the spirit 
of the constitutionalism of the EU Member States, and introduces some aspects of 
                                         
7 See: Daniel J. Elazar, “The Constitution of the State of Israel. Introduction,” Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs (1993) // http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles/const-intro-93.htm. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See: Ingolf Pernice, supra note 2; Ingolf Pernice, “The treaty of Lisbon: multilevel constitutionalism in 
action,” Columbia Journal of European Law Vol. 15, No. 3 (February 2009): 385. 
10 Jolanta Bieliauskaitė and Vytautas Šlapkauskas, “European constitutionalism as the metatheory of the 
construction of legal and political reality and the challenges for its development,” DANUBE: Law and 
Economics Review Vol. 7, No. 1 (April 2016): 50 // DOI: 10.1515/danb-2016-0003 
11 In 1992, human rights, established in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty acquired a constitutional force above the regular statutes, which means, that a 
regular Knesset (Parliamentary) statute cannot infringe upon these rights, unless it fulfils the 
requirements of the Basic Laws. See more: Aharon Barak, “Constitutional Revolution: Israel's Basic 
Laws,” Constitutional Forum Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1993): 83-84. 
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Barak’s legal ideology that could be relevant for the formation of European demos 
and constitutionalism. 
In order to achieve this aim, the research is focused on the issues that 
emerge in the area of three main pillars of constitutionalism: (1) adherence to the 
rule of law, (2) limited and accountable government, and (3) protection of 
fundamental rights.12 We believe that contemporary legal ideology should be based 
on an interpretation of these pillars that is understandable for all members of 
society.  
1. THE DISOBEDIENCE OF RULES AS A THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 
AND DEMOCRACY 
Why is disobeying rules considered a threat to the rule of law and democracy? 
There are many answers to this question. However, we believe that it was 
comprehensively answered by F. A. Hayek’s deep analysis of the nature of rules 
and order 13 , which stresses the necessity to free ourselves wholly from the 
erroneous conception that there can first be a society which then gives itself laws. 
This erroneous conception is basic to the constructivist rationalism from Descartes 
and Hobbes through Rousseau and Bentham to contemporary legal positivism. 
According to Hayek, it is only as a result of individuals observing certain common 
rules that a group of people can live together in those orderly relations, which we 
call a society. Individuals differing in their general values may occasionally agree 
on, and effectively collaborate for, the achievement of particular concrete purposes. 
But such agreement on particular ends will never suffice for forming that lasting 
order which we call a society.14  Thus, the social order is characteristic to any 
society and functions only if common (social) rules are observed. There is as much 
society as its members (are able to) follow the common rules of conduct. 
The obedience of common rules and especially the rules of security not only 
allowed the development of society but also the perception of this obedience as a 
common good and as justice. This perception of justice has strengthened social 
control and self-regulation. Therefore, as L. Baublys notes, justice is a fundamental 
                                         
12 See: Jiunn-Rong Yeh and Wen-Chen Chang “The Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism: Its 
Features, Challenges and Solutions,” Penn State International Law Review Vol .27, No. 1 (2008); Aoife 
O’Donoghue “International Constitutionalism and the State,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 
Vol. 11, No. 4 (2013): 1021-1045 // DOI: 10.1093/icon/mot048. 
13 See: Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol. I: Rules and Order (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973). 
14 Friedrich August von Hayek, Teisė, įstatymų leidyba ir laisvė. I: Taisyklės ir tvarka (Law, Legislation 
and Liberty. Vol. I: Rules and Order) (Vilnius: Eugrimas, 1998), 146–147. 
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principle of social life that indicates the moral, legal, economic, political limits and 
possibilities of human conduct.15 
Hayek stresses the practical importance of the obedience of rules, which is the 
necessary condition for actions. If society wants to survive, it has to find ways to 
learn those rules and means to maintain them.16  In order for law as a social 
institution to be efficient, individuals must interiorise legal rules and (or) obey them 
under the influence of other social forces. Both options were developed by practical 
reason but their relationship has always been a question of community and state 
policy. Coercive means prevailed before the era of liberal democracy. However, 
nowadays the means of socialisation are the priority. Legal ideology has always 
been a mediator in this complicated process which connects legal rules with the 
conduct of individuals and groups. Unlike political ideology, legal ideology emerges 
together with community and retains its social role. It can be understood as a 
certain form of social consciousness – a system of value-based and cognitive 
premises, which is reflected and established in a legal doctrine. 
The dual – normative and value-based – nature of law covers the potential 
possibilities of law to be conceived as absolute and as a tool of coercion. They are 
determined by the attitude of authorities (elite) towards the relationship between 
society and law. Classically, law as a social institution has two functions: the 
protection of social and (or) elite values (order) and the implementation of justice. 
According to H. J. Berman, these two purposes of law - protection of order and 
implementation of justice – which lie within the Western legal tradition, are 
engaged in an inner conflict. The order itself is perceived as something that 
includes an internal tension between the need for change and the need to maintain 
stability. Justice is also being treated dialectically. It involves the tension between 
individual rights and public welfare.17 These tensions in society may increase if 
authorities, while implementing their interests, unadvisedly contrast order and 
justice. This situation traditionally leads to the state of war.18 
Therefore, public authority usually aims to foster obedience to common rules 
by means of purposeful creation and implementation of a particular legal ideology. 
In this case “particular legal ideology” means that it not only avoids confrontation 
with the legal psychology of social groups. Instead, the legal ideology relies on legal 
psychology and purposefully fosters a trust in law and justice. However, the role of 
legal ideology has notably changed in the second half of the twentieth century. The 
                                         
15 Linas Baublys, Antikinė teisingumo samprata ir jos įtaka Vakarų teisės tradicijai (Ancient Concept of 
Justice and Its Impact on Western Legal Tradition) (Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universitetas, 2005), 33. 
16 Friedrich August von Hayek, supra note 14, 147. 
17 Harold J. Berman, Teisė ir revoliucija: Vakarų teisės tradicijos formavimasis (Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition) (Vilnius: Pradai, 1999), 41. 
18 Ibid. 
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liberal policy of the 1960’s and 1970’s together with the growing protection of 
social, economic and cultural rights as well as the weakening role of morality and 
religion provided a favourable social context for the formation of the consumer 
society. The power of Western countries increased and they began to promote the 
idea of modern (technical) law as a large-scale social and economic planning tool19 
without a clear moral element.20 
Modern (technical) law can be analysed from two different angles: 1) its 
relationship with the government; 2) its relationship with society. The analysis of 
the relationship between law and government reveals its advantage: law, as a 
technical rule can be adapted to any regulatory objective. In other words, while 
developing the instrumental approach towards law, authorities have become 
accustomed to unilateral decisions about which legal rules are useful to follow and 
which are not relevant or even limit the opportunities to effectively meet new 
challenges. However, the society understands this advantage of modern law as a 
disadvantage. In the consciousness of social groups regulated by law, the 
separation of law from morality and customs determines its actual decay in the 
minds of many citizens because they do not have the necessary competence to 
recognize and take over the technical law. Thus, when the instrumental approach 
towards law increases, the social value of positive law decreases, since the 
technical law is strange for society. Instead of establishing law as an effective and 
independent tool of social control and management we get the opposite result: 
society does not recognise the technical law and therefore it is not socially efficient. 
Hence, issues of obedience to legal rules arise. 
When members of a liberal democratic society do not obey the requirements 
of law, they destroy the society itself. These theoretical insights are also relevant to 
the EU where the systemic crisis has started in 2008-2009 from the global financial 
crisis and developed to the crisis of social security and liberal democracy. This 
situation was influenced by inter alia the issues of the EU (legal) rules obedience on 
the level of domestic politics,21as well as the longstanding instrumental approach 
towards law since the goals of the European Communities were primarily political 
and economical ones.22 Meanwhile the role of law was to serve these goals. 
Recently, the EU is coping with the refugee crisis that is complicated by the 
fact that the people of the EU Member States barely trust the ability of the EU law 
                                         
19  Roger Cotterrell, Teisės sociologija. Įvadas (The Sociology of Law: An Introduction) (Kaunas: 
Dangerta, 1997), 64. 
20 Ibid., 66. 
21  Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, “Eurozone Crisis and European Integration: Functional Spillover, Political 
Spillback?” European Integration Vol. 35, No. 3 (April 2013) //  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2013.774785 
22 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. III., 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2000), 314. 
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and authorities to guarantee the balance between public order and justice, which is 
especially fragile when the level of security decreases. Thus, the crisis of the EU 
and its constitutionalism is influenced by inter alia the crisis of the obedience to 
legal rules and the very concept of the rule of law. 
In order to restore public trust in law and to uphold the compliance with the 
rules we have to use a modern legal ideology that justifies the idea of the rule of 
law. It is therefore necessary to rely on the experience of those countries which 
operate under conditions of active external threats at the same time as preserving 
the integrity of society and its identity since the rule of law and the maintenance of 
public identity are the two sides of the same social process. Therefore, the EU could 
take an example from modern legal ideology of Israel, which is greatly influenced 
by the jurisprudential ideas of Aharon Barak. 
The idea of the rule of law as the law of rules and the rule of values is one of 
the central ideas of Barak’s constitutional theory. He distinguishes three aspects of 
the rule of law: formal rule of law, jurisprudential rule of law, and substantive rule 
of law. Although these aspects overlap, there are substantial differences among 
them: 
Formal rule of law means that everyone in the country — individuals, 
corporations, and arms of the state — must act according to law, and unlawful 
activity must meet with the organized sanction of society. Rule of law, in this 
sense, has a double meaning, extending to both the legality of the rule and the 
rule of the law. (…) Rule of law in this sense is not related to the quality of the 
regime but rather the principle of public order.23 
The jurisprudential approach to the rule of law stresses the minimum 
requirements that a legal system needs in order to exist. They discern the legal 
system from the gang whose leader imposes its will on everyone else. Here the 
approaches of various legal scholars vary. In developing a system of interpretation, 
Barak especially maintains the requirement of publicity and certainty of the law, 
stability of the law, and security in interpersonal relationships. According to him: 
This means that the law should be clear and readable. A person must be able to 
understand what is forbidden and what is permitted by reading the law, if with 
the help of a legal professional. A statute is not a riddle. Similarly, there can be 
no retroactive statutes, particularly not in criminal law. Ultimately, law must be 
stable.24 
However, the principle of the rule of law cannot be equated only with the 
                                         
23 H.C. 428/86 Barzilai v. State of Israel, 40(3) as cited in Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 242. Also see: Aharon Barak, The Judge in a 
Democracy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 51–56. 
24 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, supra note 23, 244. 
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principle of regime legality supplemented by jurisprudential requirements. Barak 
believes that: 
Rule of law must include an aspect that Dworkin calls the ‘right conception’ of 
rule of law. There is no general agreement over the scope of this concept. I 
think it derives from the very concept of democracy. (...) For our purposes, rule 
of law requires both majority rule (legislative supremacy) and human rights 
(guaranteeing the system’s fundamental values).25 
He describes the substantive rule of law as: 
The rule of law that constitutes the proper balance between, on the one hand, 
society’s need for political independence, social equality, economic development, 
and domestic order, and, on the other hand, the needs of the individual, his or 
her personal liberty, and his or her human dignity.26 
He maintains, that the “rule of law is not just public order. It is social justice based 
on social order.” 27  Thus, Barak reminds us that law not only has a formal 
(technical), but also a value-based aspect where the highest values are human 
rights and the needs of society. Their balance can manage the emerging conflict 
between order and justice. 
2. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF UNDERSTANDING OF COMMERCIALIZED 
DEMOCRACY AS A THREAT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
AND SOCIETY 
One of the fundamental elements of the concept of constitutionalism is limited 
and accountable government. Only in a democratic society is it possible to achieve 
this. However, lately democratic processes are influenced by several factors that 
strengthen the tension between government and society. 
The issues in this area may be traced in the neoliberal approach towards a 
government, when the public (state) sector is narrowed and broad opportunities for 
market mechanisms to operate in the public sector according to the principles 
elaborated in the private sector or market management are provided. It is based on 
the idea argued by the nineteenth-century political economy theorists that the 
public interest is satisfied only if it is allowed to express private interests freely.28 
The implementation of this project of the “New Right” under conditions of a 
universal democracy, weak moral values and expanding legal nihilism led not only 
to the maintenance of the welfare state idea, but also caused a totally unexpected 
                                         
25 Ibid., 246. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28  Wayne Parsons, Viešoji politika: Politikos analizės teorijos ir praktikos įvadas (Public Policy: An 
Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis) (Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2001), 21. 
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social phenomena - three so-called disabilities of a modern society: individualism, 
the priority of “instrumental reason”, and their negative consequences to a 
democracy. 29  During this period the expansion of freedom has become more 
important than public security. The residents of industrialised societies got 
increasingly concerned about the issues of individual life quality. This approach was 
formed under the conditions of moral relativism, when the market deregulation on 
the state level become an essential incentive for society’s members to develop an 
“instrumental reason”, i.e. such rationality, which provides cost-effective measures 
to achieve the objectives. This has a negative impact on a democracy since the 
relationship of democracy and global commercialization not only extends to the 
number of democracy actors but also presupposes the conditions for the formation 
of the controversial citizen-consumer concept. 
Nowadays people manifest themselves as consumers; this is what leads to their 
power, and therefore, the commercialization has become the reverse side of 
democratization. (…) A dual nature of democratization – the grant of 
government power to people as citizens and as consumers – helps to explain 
why only few dare to criticize the on-going transformation of society.30 
In other words, the citizen is willing to obey the law, and the consumer tends to 
have more options for seeking benefits. This tendency is relevant not only to 
individuals as consumers but also to the EU Member States. Therefore, we observe 
the deficit of their solidarity. 
The coalescence of liberal democracy and a free-market changes the structure 
of society: it becomes commercialised and its values become ambiguous.31  For 
instance, the legal order and citizenship are perceived as an individual commodity, 
as an object of negotiation between the state and interest groups. This means that 
modern democracy has moved away from the concept of liberal democracy as 
found in the early twentieth century, as serving to build civil society. This 
democracy commercialism tends to be called post-democracy and is characterized 
by the following features: 1) devaluation of achievements of governmental 
institutions; 2) expanding privatization and commercialization of the public sector, 
particularly education, health care and other social services; 3) increasing role of 
transnational corporations and lobby groups in policy and legislation.32 Here we 
observe the dangerous tendency of sociability loss or alienation. Democratic 
procedures chain the powers of management and control as well as responsibility, 
                                         
29 Charles Taylor, Autentiškumo etika (The Ethics of Authenticity) (Vilnius: Aidai, 1996), 25–34. 
30 Fareed Zakaria, Budusheje svobody: neliberalnaja demokratija v SSHA I za ikh predelami (The Future 
of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad) (Moskva: Ladomir, 2004), 241. 
31 Zygmunt Bauman, Likvidi meilė: apie žmonių ryšių trapumą (Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human 
Bonds) (Vilnius: Apostrofa, 2007), 9−10. 
32  Colin Crouch, Postdemokratija (Post-Democracy) (Moskva: Izdatelskij dom Gosudarstvenovo 
universiteta – Vyshej shkoly ehkonomiki, 2010), 122−130. 
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so that no single governance body should have both the powers of management 
and control and that inappropriate or even ineffective decisions should not incur 
personal political and legal responsibility of leaders. These tendencies strengthen 
the tension between government and society. 
This is also relevant for the EU since the era of globalisation actualizes 
activities of a “network state”, such as the EU, as well as the problem of political 
theory: how to create a competent and accountable government? Who and on what 
basis does the “network state” govern? Can only individuals and their market-based 
relationships guarantee the maintenance of justice? However, European 
constitutionalism has no clear theoretical insights on protection of legal values that 
could provide the basis for addressing the general problem of political theory. In 
addition, in order to reduce opportunities of formation of anarchic nature of public 
policy and the dissociation of social structure it is also important to pay attention to 
public confidence in law and its ability to maintain legal values. 
In this context it should be noted that Barak discerns formal democracy as 
concerned with the electoral process governed by the majority and expressed in 
legislative supremacy, and substantive democracy as concerned with fundamental 
values and human rights. 33 He strongly disagrees that democracy is just a majority 
rule and emphasizes the morality of democracy, which is based on human dignity 
and equality of persons.34 Thus, he calls us to strengthen the value-based approach 
towards democracy. 
Although Barak admits the importance of other branches of government, the 
main role in maintaining the constitutional order and protection of democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights he assigns to courts and judges in particular. Barak 
attributes to judges two main roles: (1) bridging the gap between law 
(government) and society; (2) protection of the constitution and human rights and 
thus the maintenance of the coherence of the legal system as a whole. Analysis 
conducted by N. Baeten revealed that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) meets 
the judicial framework set forth by Barak: 
The Court did not only protect the constitution and democracy, but it also 
actively engaged in enhancing the EU constitutional model and its democratic 
character (…). Similarly, the citizenship case law exemplifies the ways in which 
the Court has actively interpreted the Treaty provisions on citizenship so as to 
connect their wording to the social reality of EU citizens and, thereby, effectively 
bridging the gap between the law and life.35 
                                         
33 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, supra note 23, 239. 
34 Aharon Barak, “On Society, Law and Judging,” Tulsa Law Review Vol. 74, No. 2 (2011): 297; Aharon 
Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, supra note 23, 236. 
35  See: Niels Baeten, “Judging the European Court of Justice: the Jurisprudence of Aharon Barak 
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According to Barak, preconditions of realizing the judicial role are judicial 
impartiality and objectivity, social consensus, and public confidence. He also pays 
special attention to the theory of balancing as a complex judicial tool and to 
constitutional and statutory interpretation as instruments for realizing the judicial 
role.36 He believes that: 
a mistake of the judiciary in times of terrorism is worse than a mistake of the 
legislature and executive in times of terrorism. The reason is that the judiciary’s 
mistakes will remain with the democracy when the threat of terrorism passes 
and will be entrenched in the case law of the court as a magnet for the 
development of new and problematic laws.37 
A strong and independent judiciary is important for the government (be it national 
or transnational) so that it would not be able to manipulate the administration of 
justice and the rule of law. However, judges do not have to interfere in the 
democratic process and affect the will of people so that they could replace politics 
in political decision-making.38 Here a balance is also needed. 
3. BALANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE FACE OF A 
THREAT TO PUBLIC SECURITY 
One of the most important means of minimizing the tension between justice 
and order is the constitutionalization of human rights and freedoms and the 
constitutional control of their compliance. The idea of legislation constitutionality 
control has become not only an essential condition for judicial activism, but also a 
guarantee of the quality of individual freedom and democratic society. Fundamental 
rights are guaranteed nationally by the constitutions of individual countries and at 
the EU level by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The ECJ is a last resort for 
citizens of the EU Member States seeking redress. 39 Although this court does not 
perform a constitutional control function (in its classical sense), it also faces a 
problem: how to balance the value-based and normative aspects of human rights, 
so that this balance would adequately meet the changing nature of social reality 
and would not reduce the already achieved level of human rights protection? The 
answer to this question is complicated, for several reasons. 
Human rights express a standard of individual freedom and social security, 
the interpretation of which can be adequate, extended or narrow. It depends on the 
                                                                                                                       
Through a European Lens,” Columbia Journal of European Law Vol. 18, No.1 (2011): 155. 
36 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra note 23, xix. 
37 Ibid., 285. 
38 E.g. see discussion: Richard A. Posner, “Enlightened Despot,” New Republic (April 23, 2007) // 
https://newrepublic.com/article/60919/enlightened-despot; Barak Medina, “Four Myths of Judicial 
Review: A Response to Richard Posner's Criticism of Aharon Barak's Judicial Activism” (June 2007) // 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.992972. 
39 Communication Department of the European Commission, “Human rights” (2016) // 
https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/human-rights_en 
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actual insecurity. Usually, there is no rush to change the interpretation of human 
rights, believing that the emerged or increased social insecurity is a temporary 
phenomenon. The relatively peaceful coexistence of the European states enabled 
the EU Member States and the EU institutions to develop the judicial practice of 
extended interpretation of human rights and freedoms. At the same time the neo-
liberal democracy, the dissociation of law from moral and religious values as well as 
its instrumentalization respectively determines a consumerist approach towards 
human rights without related duties. Thus conceived absoluteness of human rights 
encourages the society to transform social organization according to its needs. Its 
structure and modus operandi becomes the object of choice. This consumerist 
approach barely recognizes any higher humanism, which enables a sense of being 
in society and limits the pursuit of profit and the inhumane treatment of others. 
However, such imperatives as well as the common will and human rights are not 
possible without a society that bases its existence on the conscious individuals who 
freely decide to live together, rather than on individual egoism.40 The consumerist 
approach as well as extended interpretation of human rights strengthens the 
tension between freedom and security. 
According to B. Buzan, most of the threats arise from the fact that people are 
living in a social environment which inevitably generates social, economic and 
political pressure.41 Usually, we distinguish four types of social threats: physical 
threats (e.g. pain, injury, death etc.), economic threats (e.g. deprivation of 
property or destruction, deprivation of employment or resources etc.), threats to 
the rights (e.g. imprisonment, denial of human rights etc.) and the threat to status 
(e.g. public humiliation etc.). As a rule, these threats occur not alone, but together 
at once. They reveal a dilemma: how to balance an individual’s freedom of action, 
so that it does not pose a real and potential threat to the freedoms of other 
individuals, or how to increase community freedom without increasing government 
oppression. 
[Lately,] the EU Member States’ security situation is changing since it is affected 
by the multipolar world states’ interactions and the threat of terrorism. It will 
take uncertain transitional period until this fundamental international security 
change will be perceived by the EU Member States and the EU’s supra-national 
judicial authorities. One thing is clear, that the practice of extended 
                                         
40  Horst Kurnitzky, Necivilizuota civilizacija (An Uncivilized Civilization) (Vilnius: Dialogo kultūros 
institutas, 2004), 37. 
41 Barry Buzan, Žmonės, valstybės ir baimė: tarptautinio saugumo studijos po šaltojo karo (People, 
States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era) (Vilnius: 
Eugrimas, 1997), 71. 
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interpretation of the rights and freedoms does not meet the essential changes of 
the EU’s security conditions anymore.42 
The growing tension between security and freedom inevitably promotes the 
strict interpretation of national law and order and raises questions about justice and 
social justice in particular. These tensions actualize the tension between 
government and society not only in the EU Member States, but across the EU (e.g. 
“Brexit”).43 Thus, the EU will have to find a balance between these social values. 
In his writings, Barak widely analyses the problem of balancing between 
public order and security on the one hand and constitutional rights and freedoms on 
the other hand. Its solution is found deep in the general principles of law, including 
reasonableness, good faith and proportionality, according to which the liberty of the 
individual can be limited on the condition that the restriction is proportionate.44 
As Barak notes, an individual has not only rights, but also duties to society. 
One of the most important duties is to support public order. It is one of the most 
important principles of any democratic society that includes guarantee of state 
security and public peace as well as of individual rights and welfare. Therefore, 
every law has to be interpreted as if it has the purpose to implement public order.45 
Contrary to the Europeans, who during the time of peace enjoyed a broad 
interpretation of human rights, due to repeatedly experienced large-scale attacks 
the Israeli people have become more willing to accept some limits to their freedom 
in return for greater protection.46 Therefore, there is no surprise that Barak states 
that human rights are not absolute47 and that not all rights are created equal in 
importance.48 
Human rights are the rights of a human being as a part of society. The rights of 
the individual must conform to the existence of society, the existence of a 
government, and the existence of national goals. The power of the state is 
essential to the existence of the state and the existence of human rights 
themselves. Therefore, limitations on human rights reflect a national 
compromise between the needs of the state and the rights of the individual.49 
The purposes that justify limitations on human rights are derived from the values 
on which society is founded. In a constitutional democracy, these values are 
                                         
42 Jolanta Bieliauskaitė, et al., supra note 5: 387. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “Barak, Aharon (1936–), Personal History, Biographical Highlights, Personal Chronology:, Influences 
and Contributions, Exploring, Influence on the Israeli Legal System” // 
http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/articles/pages/5561/Barak-Aharon-1936.html 
45 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra note 23, 75. 
46 Jeffrey A. Larsen and Tasha L. Pravecek, supra note 6: 4. 
47 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra note 23, 83. 
48  Aharon Barak, Proportionality. Constitutional rights and their limitations (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 11. 
49 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra note 23, 83. 
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democratic values.50 
Barak notes the fragility of a democratic regime and warns against taking it 
for granted. 51  Therefore, he talks about defensive democracy and pays special 
attention not only to the scope and limitation of constitutional rights52 and solutions 
of their conflicts, but also to the protection of human rights in times of terror.53 He 
insists that democracies should conduct the struggle against terrorism within the 
framework of the law and with a proper balance between two conflicting values and 
principles:  
On the one hand, we must consider the values and principles relating to the 
security of the State and its citizens. Human rights cannot justify undermining 
national security in every case and in all circumstances. (…) On the other hand 
(…) national security cannot justify undermining human rights in every case and 
under all circumstances. (…) the rights of every individual must be preserved, 
including those of the individual suspected of being a terrorist.54 
Proportionality is one of the most important principles of constitutional 
adjudication and management of disputes involving conflicts between two rights 
claims, or between a rights provision and a legitimate state or public interest.55 
However, as Barak emphasizes, the rules of proportionality should be respected and 
applied by every branch of government.56 
From German origins, the principle of proportionality has spread across 
Europe into Commonwealth systems and Israel. As A. S. Sweet and J. Mathews 
notice, the principle of proportionality has also migrated to the three treaty-based 
regimes: the European Union (EU),
 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the authors, 
“proportionality-based rights adjudication now constitutes one of the defining 
features of global constitutionalism, if global constitutionalism can be said to exist 
at all.”57 
One of the most significant works on proportionality is the one written by 
Barak in which he focuses on the proportionality of a limitation applied within a 
democratic system, on a constitutional right by a law (a statute or the common 
law).58 He derives proportionality as a constitutional concept from democracy, the 
                                         
50 Aharon Barak, supra note 48, 245-246. 
51 Aharon Barak, “Human Rights in Times of Terror – A Judicial Point of View,” European Court of Human 
Rights. Opening of the Juridical year (January 2016): 1. 
52 See more: Aharon Barak, supra note 48. 
53 E. g. Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra note 23, and other works. 
54 Aharon Barak, supra note 51: 2-3. 
55  Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism,” 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 47, No. 72 (2008): 73. 
56 Aharon Barak, supra note 51: 12. 
57 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, supra note 55: 73-74. 
58 See: Aharon Barak, supra note 48 and other works. 
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rule of law, principle theory, and constitutional interpretation. 59  This principle 
serves as a key tool for protection of constitutional rights in a constitutionally 
rights-based democratic society.60 
Accordingly, Barak describes proportionality as “the set of rules determining 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a limitation of a constitutionally 
protected right by a law to be constitutionally permissible.” 61  His definition of 
proportionality reveals several important components (a proper purpose, rational 
connection, necessity and balance). However, here we would like to pay more 
attention to the notion of balancing, which, according to Barak, is central to life and 
law, to the relationship between human rights and the public interest, or amongst 
human rights. It “reflects the multi-faceted nature of the human being, of society 
generally, and of democracy in particular. It is an expression of the understanding 
that the law is not ‘all or nothing’.”62 
Barak discerns two types of balancing: (1) balancing as one of the 
components of proportionality, which is relevant to the examination of the 
constitutionality of laws which limit a constitutional right, and (2) interpretative 
balancing, which is relevant for the examination of the interpretation of a law 
whose purpose includes conflicting principles. The latter type of balancing deals 
with the interpretation (meaning) of the law and not with its constitutionality 
(validity). 63 Thus, he formulates the basic balancing rule as follows: 
The more important it is to prevent marginal harm on the constitutional right, 
and the higher the probability such harm will occur, then the marginal benefit to 
the public interest (or to the protection of other persons’ rights) required to 
justify such limits should be more socially important, more urgent, and more 
probable.64 
The balancing test is passed, and the limitation of a constitutional right is 
proportional stricto sensu if the harm caused to the right by the law does not 
exceed the benefit gained by it.65 Although, according to Barak interpretation does 
not explain fully why proportionality should be preferred over other criteria that 
also strive to achieve constitutional unity, the interpretive explanation is of 
considerable weight 66  and it is reasonable to say that the principle of 
proportionality is often more significant than the other criteria, because it enables 
subjects with different thinking to seek a social consensus within the limits of the 
                                         
59 Ibid., 240. 
60 Ibid., 4. 
61 Ibid., 3. 
62 Ibid., 345-346. 
63 Ibid., 4. 
64 Ibid., 11. 
65 Ibid., 343. 
66 Ibid., 240. 
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protection of liberal democratic values. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The evolution of neoliberalism in the EU led to the entrenchment of social 
thought based on the ratio of costs and profits on all levels of social relationships, 
i.e. between individuals, their groups and between the states. This way of thinking 
encourages obedience to the rule of law only as far as it is consistent with the 
interests of individuals, their groups and states. In this context legal 
instrumentalism as a contemporary concept of law of consumerist society has 
formed. It is characterised by the aim to reduce costs and enhance profit as well as 
by rigorous disjuncture from moral values. Therefore, we observe the tendency to 
disregard the rule of law in all levels of social relations in the EU. 
2. Neoliberal thought and legal instrumentalism prevent the EU Member 
States from a timely mobilization of joint efforts to overcome external threats, the 
growth of which under conditions of globalization significantly destabilizes the 
classical socio-cultural tensions between government and society, order and justice, 
and freedom and security. The destabilization of these classical tensions 
additionally causes the internal disorganization (disconnection between values and 
compliance with the rules) of the EU societies. Therefore, it can reasonably be 
argued that the instrumental approach to law not only forms the selective approach 
to the recognition of the rule of law, but also denies the value-based nature of law. 
3. The coalescence of liberal democracy and the free-market has changed the 
structure of society: it has become a consumer society with ambiguous values. 
Legal order and citizenship have already been considered objects of negotiation 
between the state and the interests groups. Thus, modern democracy has moved 
away from the concept of liberal democracy, according to which the government 
serves the political nation and the development of civil society. When 
commercialized groups’ struggles for political power are defined only by election 
periods, and social relations prevail in a free market, the political elites and other 
social actors often lack united efforts to protect justice and common values. Under 
these social conditions the role of the judiciary in defence of democracy and 
maintenance of justice becomes extremely important. The necessity of judicial 
activity stems from the nature of liberal democracy (adherence to the rule of law 
and protection of human rights) and it will grow together with the growing tensions 
between social values and, accordingly, the need for their balance. 
4. Neoliberalism has entrenched itself in the EU societies as a prevailing legal 
ideology according to which individuals and social groups ground and interpret their 
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selective attitude towards the adherence to the rule of law, democracy and 
accountable government and protection of human rights. Selectivity of profit as a 
structure of social thought not only makes individual interests absolute, but also 
works against the formation of the EU’s common values and demos. In the context 
of growing external and internal treats neoliberalism as an ideology increasingly 
limits the functionality of liberal democracy. Therefore, the continuous development 
of this functionality must be based on the relevant socio-legal ideology. 
5. Israel as a liberal democracy was established and functions under 
conditions of constant external and internal threats. In this context Barak’s theory 
has been developed as a constitutional theory of continually seeking adherence to 
the rule of law, limited and accountable government, and consensus in the 
protection of human rights. He stresses the value-based aspect of the rule of law 
(substantive rule of law) and rejects the consumerist approach towards human 
rights that prevails not only in the EU, but also in Western societies in general. 
The pursuit of social consensus has its value-based limits within which liberal 
democracy can exist. Hence, it is necessary to look for a balance of classical socio-
cultural tensions between government and society, order and justice, and freedom 
and security, which can be achieved on the basis of the principle of proportionality. 
Therefore, Barak’s legal ideology focuses on a balance between public values and 
protection of human rights, and a commitment not only to human rights and 
freedoms but also to other social values, including public security, is highly relevant 
in the context of constitutionalism of the EU and its Member States. 
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